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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Donald Jay timely appealed from the District Court's Remittitur following an
appeal to the District Court from the Trial Court's (Magistrate's) Judgment of Conviction.
On appeal, Mr. Jay asserts that the District Court erred when it orally affirmed the Trial
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motion to Suppress.

Specifically,

Mr. Jay argues, based on United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) and Florida v.
Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013), that law enforcement conducted a warrantless search

of Mr. Jay's vehicle when law enforcement opened the door of a vehicle in which
Mr. Jay was sitting.
Additionally, Mr. Jay asserts that this Courtshould reverse the District Court's oral
order affirming the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motion to
Suppress based on the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in State v. Clarke, 446 P.3d
451 (2019), as the evidence that provided the factual basis for Mr. Jay's guilty pleas
were obtained during the search of Mr. Jay's person and vehicle after an arrest for a
completed misdemeanor offense that did not occur in the presence of law enforcement.
Mr. Jay further asserts the holding in Clarkeis applicable to his case based on Griffith v.
United States, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In early January 201 B, Trooper Rodean, of the Idaho State Police observed a
vehicle parked on the side of Interstate 84. (R Vol. I, p.68.) The vehicle was partially
parked on the shoulder of the roadside and partially parked on a gravel stretch located
adjacent to the Interstate. (R Vol. I, pp.68-69.) Upon his approach, Trooper Rodean
observed that the vehicle was not running and ''the hazard lights were not flashing." (R
Vol. I, p.69.)
Trooper Rodean pulled behind the vehicle, looked inside, and thought the driver
was possibly asleep. (R Vol. I, pp.68-69.)

Trooper Rodean knocked on the door and

Mr. Jay immediately began to move. (R Vol. I, p.69.) 1After waiting only a couple of
seconds, Trooper Rodean opened the vehicle's door and started speaking with Mr. Jay.
(R Vol. I, p.69.)

Mr. Jay told Officer Rodean his name was Darren and informed Trooper Rodean
that he did not have a driver's license. (R Vol. I, p.69.) Mr. Jay was eventually arrested
for driving without privileges and during a search of Mr. Jay's person Trooper Rodean
located an identification card with Mr. Jay's true name. (R Vol. I, p.69.) Trooper Rodean
conducted an inventory search of Mr. Jay's vehicle and founddrug paraphernalia. (R
Vol. I, pp.69-70.) Mr. Jay was ultimately citedfor the misdemeanor offenses of driving
without privileges, false information to law enforcement, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R Vol. I, p.8.)
1

The Trial Court did not make factual findings regarding the specific fact of whether
Mr. Jay was moving immediately after Trooper Rodean knocked on the window.
Mr. Jay nonetheless asserts that this movement is apparent from Trooper Rodean's
dashboard camera footage that was admitted during the April 24, 2018, evidentiary
hearing regarding Mr. Jay's Motion to Suppress Evidence. See Defendant's Exhibit A,
9:20:33 - 9:20:41 . Mr. Jay recognizes that the District Court addressed this factual
issue and will provide a response later in this brief. (See 4/22/19 Tr., p.23, L.2 - p.24,
L.23.)
2

Mr. Jay filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence ((hereinafter, "Motion to Suppress")
R Vol. I, pp.17-18), arguing that Trooper Rodean conducted a search when he opened
Mr. Jay's car door and that the community-care-taker exception to the warrant
requirement was not applicable because Mr. Jay was moving before Trooper Rodean
opened the vehicle's door. ((Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence
(hereinafter, "Suppression Memo"), R Vol. I, pp-1-12.) The State filed its Objection to

Motion to Suppress Evidence and Memorandum in Support Thereof ({hereinafter,
"Objection Memo"), R Vol. l,pp.40-47), wherein the State argued that a seizure
occurred, as opposed to a search, when Trooper Rodean opened Mr. Jay's car door,
which was justified by a violation I.C. § 49-660, precluding people from parking on the
side of acontrolled-access highway. (R Vol. I, pp.40-42.) The State also argued that
the community care-taker exception to the warrant requirement justified Trooper
Rodean's initial contact with Mr. Jay. (R Vol. I, pp.43-7.)
An evidentiary hearing was held on Mr. Jay's Motion to Suppress and the Trial
Court took the matter under advisement and provided the parties time for supplemental
briefing.

(4/22/18 Tr., p.45, Ls.8-19; p.46, Ls.14-16.) 2

Mr. Jay filed a Reply

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence ((hereinafter, "Reply Memo")
R Vol. I, pp.53-59), asserting that the necessary facts required to make the
determination of whether Mr. Jay was in violation of I.C. § 49-660 were not adduced at
the suppression hearing.

In its Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motion to

Suppress (hereinafter, "Memo Denying Motion to Suppress"), the Trial Court ultimately
denied Mr. Jay's Suppression Motion, reasoning that Mr. Jay violated I.C. § 49-660,
2

Idaho Appellate Rule 35(e) requires citations to the Reporter's Transcript reference
the applicable volume number. Since the Reporter's Transcripts were not provided
volume numbers, Mr. Jay will include the date of the hearing in his citations to the
Reporter's Transcripts.
3

when he parked on the side of the Interstate 84 and that violation provided Trooper
Aodean with a constitutional basis to open Mr. Jay's car door. (R Vol. I, pp.70-72.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Jay entered AlforcP pleas (R Vol. I, pp.84-86)
to driving without privileges and false information to law enforcement and preserved his
ability to challenge the denial of his suppression motion on appeal. (6/11/18 Tr., p.47,
L.19 - p.54, L.19; R Vol. I, 80-83.) In return, the State dismissed the possession of
paraphernalia charge. (6/11/18 Tr., p.59, Ls.10-15; R Vol. I, pp.80-81.) Thereafter, the
Trial Court issued its Judgment of Conviction and Mr. Jay timely appealed to the District
Court. (R Vol. I, pp.87-93.)
On appeal, Mr. Jay argued that the Trial Court erred when it denied his Motion to
Suppress, primarily arguing that Trooper Rodean conducted an unlawful search when
he opened the door of Mr. Jay's vehicle. (R., pp.100-122.) During the oral argument on
appeal, the District Court orally affirmed the Trial Court, reasoning that Trooper Rodean
did not violate Mr. Jay's state and federal constitutional rights when he opened Mr. Jay's
vehicle's door because Mr. Jay was illegally parked on the side of Interstate 84 and
because opening the vehicle's door was justified under the community caretaker
exception to the warrant requirement.

(4/22/19 Tr., p.18, L.10 - p.26, L.22.) The

District Court also held, based on State v. Irwin, 143 Idaho 103 (Ct. App. 2006), that
opening a vehicle door is not a search within the meaning of state and federal
constitutions. (4/22/19 Tr., p.26, L.23 - p.29, L.20.} Mr. Jay timely appealed. (R Vol. I,
pp.156-161.)

3

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
4

ISSUES
1.

Did the District Court err when it affirmed the Trial Court's Memo Denying Mr.
Jay's Motion to Suppress?

2.

Should this Court reverse the District Court's oral order affirming the Trial Court's
Memo Denying Motion to Suppress, based on the Idaho Supreme Court's
holding in State v. Clarke?

5

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Erred When It Affirmed The Trial Court's Memo Denying Mr.
Jay'sMotion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) and Florida v. Jardines, 133

S.Ct. 1409 (2013), the United States Supreme Court held that a search, within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, occurs when law enforcement, 1) physically
trespasses, on a 2) constitutionally protected area, i.e., persons, houses, papers, and
effects. In this case, Trooper Rodean conducted a search when he opened the door of
Mr. Jay's vehicle. Mr. Jay's state and federal constitutional rights were violated by this
search because the commission of an infraction offense does not justify a warrantless
search.

B.

Standardof Review
"On review of a decision rendered by a district court sitting in its intermediate,

appellate capacity," Idaho appellate courts review "the trial court (magistrate) record to
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from
those findings." State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 414-15 (2009). "If those findings are so
supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the
magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure."

Id. Thus, Idaho appellate courts do not review the decision of the magistrate. State

v.

Trusda/1, 155 Idaho 965, 968 (Ct. App. 2014).Rather, Idaho appellate courts are
procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. Id.
6

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision
on a motion to suppress is challenged, Idaho appellate courts accept the trial court's
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, butfreely review the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho
559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility
of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106 (1995).
Unless the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, they will not be set
aside. City of Meridian

v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 434-35 (2013). "[E]ven if the

evidence is conflicting, if the findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent
evidence [an appellate court] will not disturb those findings on appeal." Id.
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words and that those
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning.

Verska

v.

Saint

A/phonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 993 (2011 ). A statute must be construed as

a whole, and that if a statute is not ambiguous, the Court does not construe the statute,
but rather, simply follows the law as written. Id.
C.

Applicable State And Federal Constitutional Standards
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend IV. This guarantee has been
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to
the states.Mapp

v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Further, Mr. Jay has similar liberty

7

interests protected under Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.4 See State v.
Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 146 (1998) ("Like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of

Art. I, § 17 is to protect Idaho citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy against
arbitrary governmental intrusion.").

"[S]earches and seizures 'conducted outside the

judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well
delineated exceptions."' Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (quoting
Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984)).

Primary evidence and derivative evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the illegal
government action. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846 (2004); see also Wong Sun v.
United States, 317 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).

When a defendant moves to exclude

evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
government carries the burden of proving that the search or seizure in question was
reasonable. State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484,486 (2004).

D.

Trooper Rodean Had Reasonable Suspicion To Seize Mr. Jay For A
Violation of Idaho Code Section 49-660, But Elected Not To Seize Mr. Jay
For That Violation Which Precluded The District Court And Trial Court
From Relying On That Violation As A Constitutional Basis For Trooper
Rodean's Decision To Open Mr. Jay's Car Door
The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement has been held to apply to

brief investigatory detentions.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).

Limited

investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when
justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or
4

Due to the similar projections afforded under both the federal and state constitutions,
Mr. Jay generally refers to his rights in the context of the United States Constitution;
however, Mr. Jay is not abandoning his state constitutional claims and uses this
shorthand for ease of reading.
8

is about to commit a crime.
Reasonable suspicion

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983).

requires more than

a mere hunch or inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
The stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of its occupants and is therefore
subject to Fourth Amendment restraints.State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 888, 187 P .3d
1261, 1263 (Ct. App. 2008). "Because a traffic stop is limited in scope and duration, it is
analogous to an investigative detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in
Terry v. Ohio,392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)." Id.at 889, 187 P.3d at
1262.

1.

The Trial Court's Ruling. That Mr. Jay Was Parkedln Violation Ofldaho
Code Section 49-660, Was Not Supported by Factual Findings

The Trial Court ruled that Trooper Rodean had probable cause to seize Mr. Jay
for violating I.C. § 49-660, because Mr. Jay was parked on the side of Interstate 84
which is a controlled access highway. (R Vol. I, pp.71-72.) As a preliminary point,
Mr. Jay does not concede, as argued by Mr. Jay in his Reply Memo, that the Trial Court
could not find that Mr. Jay was in violation of I.C. § 49-660 because there is a factual
determination necessary to rule whether a road constitutes a controlled access
highway. (R Vol. I, p.54.) Mr. Jay's specific argument follows:
[T]he State asserts that Mr. Jay was parked in violation of I.C. § 49660(1 )(a)(9), which precludes parking vehicles on a controlled access
highway. (Objection to Motion to Suppress and Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support, (hereinafter, "Objection Memo"), pp.2-3.) The
State further asserts that Mr. Jay was detained on a controlled access
highway. Contrary to the State's assertion, there was no evidence
adduced to support the State's factual assertion that Mr. Jay was detained
on a controlled access highway. No one from the Idaho Department of
Transportation testified or otherwise provided a factual basis for the
State's legal conclusion. For example, the determination of whether a
road constitutes a "public highway" is an issue of fact and law that requires
extensive factual findings. See Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211 (1986);
see also Wylie v. State, Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26 (2011)
9

(designation of State Highway System and controlled access controlled by
IDAPA 39.03. et seq.).
(R Vol. I, p.54.) The Trial Court disregarded the foregoing and ruled that Interstate 84 is
a controlled access highway pursuant to I.C. § 49-109(5)(b), which defines controlled
access highway. (R Vol. I, p.71.) Idaho Code Section 49-109(5)(b), provides:
Controlled-access. Any highway or roadway in respect to which owners or
occupants of abutting lands and other persons have no legal right of
access to or from the highway except at such points only or in such
manner as may be determined by the public authority having jurisdiction
over the highway.
I.C. § 49-109(5)(b).
In order for a court to rule a section of roadway is a controlled access highway
there must be facts in the record on which a court can rely to find that the occupants of
the abutting lands and other person have no legal right of access. Here, this factual
challenge was asserted below and there are no facts in the record supporting the Trial
Court's ruling that the, at issue, roadway is a controlled access highway. See Sterling v.

Bloom, 111 Idaho 211 (1986) (holding that the determination of whether a road
constitutes a "public highway'' is an issue of fact and law that requires extensive factual
findings). At a minimum, the Trial Court should have taken judicial notice of facts to
support its application of I.C. § 49-109(5)(b)i to the at issue roadway.

i.

The District Court Erred When Holding That The Trial Court Did Not
Need To Make Factual Findings When Applying Idaho Code
Section 49-660 To The Facts Of Mr. Jay's Case

As a preliminary matter, Mr. Jay incorporates all the arguments set for in Section
1(0)(1) of this brief by reference thereto. The District Court's erred when it overlooked
the Trial Court's failure to make factual findings regarding the applicability of I.C. § 49660 and the specific findings that Mr. Jay was parked on a controlled access highway.

10

When addressing Mr. Jay's assertion that legal rulings require factual findings, the
District Court held as follows:
[T]he Court finds the magistrate, without taking judicial notice, did note
that Interstate 84 is a controlled-access highway. And Idaho Code 49660(1 )(a)9 applies and therefore the defendant's conduct of merely
parking the vehicle on the shoulder, partway off the shoulder, is a violation
of Idaho Code 49-660(1 )(a)9.
So the Court analyzed, without specifically taking judicial notice, but
it's obvious from the evidence submitted that the officer was on 184 when
he calls into dispatch. And it is really undisputed nor was it challenged at
the motion to suppress hearing that there was any competent -- nor was
any competent evidence presented that this was not a controlled access
highway when the car was parked on the shoulder of 184. So the court
finds that factual finding by the magistrate not clearly erroneous.
(4/22/19 Tr., p.19, L.19 - p.20, L.11.)
The District Court erred holding that the Trial Court implicitly took judicial notice
that Interstate 84 is a controlled-access highway, because the applicable version of
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 (c)5 provided, ''the court shall identify the specific documents
or items that were so noticed." I.R.E. 201 (c). Here, the Trial Court did not specifically
refer to any document or exhibit that provided a factual basis for its conclusion that
Interstate 84 is a controlled-access highway as defined by I.C. § 49-109(5)(b). Again,
that determination requires and intensive factual findings. Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho
211 (1986).
Further support for Mr. Jay's argument can be found in Fortin v. State, 160 Idaho
437 (Ct. App. 2016), where a plaintiff's blanket request for a trial court to take judicial
notice of the record in an underlying criminal matter during post-conviction proceedings
was held to run afoul the specificity requirement of I.R.E. 201. While the events of the
5

Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 was amended in 2018 and the amended version was
made effective on July 1, 2018. See Rome v. State, 164 Idaho 407, 414 n.5 (2018).
Since Mr. Jay's evidentiary hearing occurred on April 18, 2018, Mr. Jay citations to
I.R.E. 201 refer to the version of the rule that pre-dated the 2018 amendments.
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underlying criminal proceedings may have been obvious to anyone who reviewed the
record from the criminal case, the Fortin Court upheld the trial court's ruling refusing to
take notice of those proceedings because of the Fortin's failure to comply with I.R.E.
201 's specificity requirement.

Similarly, the District Court's legal conclusion that

Interstate 84 is a controlled-highway might seem obvious, but the Trial Court must either
make specific factual findings or take judicial notice of materials with specific facts
supporting that conclusion before applying I.C. § 49-660.
The District Court's holding that Mr. Jay did not submit evidence at his
suppression hearing regarding the question of whether Interstate 84 is a controlled
access highway violated Mr. Jay's right to procedural due process as it shifted the
evidentiary burden at the suppression hearing from the State to Mr. Jay. (4/22/19 Tr.,
p.20, Ls.5-10.)

The constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho

guarantee due process of law before the State can deprive a citizen's liberty interest.
SeeU.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. I, §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965):Co/e
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,

132 Idaho 88 (1998)). The question then becomes, what process is due? See Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577 (1975). ''The fundamental requirement of due process is the

opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552

(1965)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States Supreme
12

Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of
Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing Smith v. Idaho
Dep't of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 (1996)).
When the defendant challenges the legality of a search based upon the absence
of a search warrant, the burden then shifts to the State to prove the legality of the
search. State v.Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 162 (2000). Once the burden has shifted, the
State must "demonstrate that the search either fell within a well-recognized exception to
the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." State
v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995).Since the State carried the burden to establish
facts that supported an exception to the warrant requirement, Mr. Jay's procedural due
process rights were violated when the District Court held the Mr. Jay had the burden to
negate the fact that Interstate 84 was a controlled-access highway.

See State v.

Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 47 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a defendant's right to due
process is violated when the State's evidentiary burden is lowered); see alsoState v.
Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 (Ct. App. 2010).

2.

Since Trooper Rodean Did Not Seize Mr. Jay For Violating Idaho
Code Section 49-660, A Violation Of That Statute Cannot Serve As
A Basis For Trooper Rodean To Open Mr. Jay's Car Door

The Trial Court's factual finding that Trooper Rodean was conducting a criminal
investigation into Mr. Jay's possible violation of I.C. § 49-660, is clearly erroneous, as it
is directly contrary to Trooper Rodean's testimony at the suppression hearing. The Trial
Court made the factual finding that ''Trooper Rodean was investigating a traffic violation,
for which he had probable cause .. ." at the time he opened Mr. Jay's car door. (R Vol.
I, p.72.)

This factual determination is not supported by substantial and competent
13

evidence because Trooper Rodean testified at the suppression hearing that he was not
conducting a criminal investigation when he opened Mr. Jay's car door.

Trooper

Rodean's relevant testimony is as follows:
Q.

. ... Did you activate your overhead lights?

A.

I did not.

Q.

Okay. Why did you not do that?

A.

Usually with a motorist assist there [are] problems with their
vehicle, things like that, we are not detaining them. So I was taught
in training not [to] kick on the front lights like a traffic stop ... when
you are detaining somebody for a violation. This is just, kind of, a
courtesy welfare check, so to speak. And I just kick on the rears to
let motorist behind us know to safely move over to give us space to
conduct business.

(4/18/18 Tr. p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.12.) It follows that the Trial Court's factual finding is
clearly erroneous, as it is directly controverted by Trooper Rodean's testimony.
i.

The District Court Erred When Holding That Trooper Rodean's
Caretaking Investigation Properly Shifted To An Investigation Of A
Violation of Idaho Code Section 49-660

As a preliminary matter, Mr. Jay incorporates the arguments previously set forth
in Section 1(0)(2) of his brief by reference thereto. The District Court's rationale for
rejecting Mr. Jay's assertion that the Trial Court should not have considered a violation
of I.C. § 49-660 because law enforcement follows:
[I] don't think [Trooper Rodean] testified that (a distressed motorist check]
was his only purpose or that he ignored the fact the car was illegally
parked, which was obvious from the statute and video. So I don't know
that the officer had to testify that since it was so obvious from the video
that the magistrate could have made that factual finding.
(4/22/19 Tr., p.4-11.) Again, Mr. Jay asserts that factual findings must be supported by
specific evidence and the District Court's reliance on the Trial Court's legal
determination constituted error, because that legal determination was not supported by
14

facts. See State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 338 (2011) (holding that trial court's factual
finding that a child witness would be harmed by hearing the defendant's voice was
erroneous as there were no facts supporting that finding). 6

3.

Since Trooper Rodean Did Not Detain Mr. Jay For Violating Code Section
49-660, That Potential Violation Cannot Be Used As A Legal Justification
For Opening Mr. Jay's Car Door

The District Court erred when affirming the Trial Court's ruling that Trooper
Rodean's decision to open Mr. Jay's car door was justified by Mr. Jay's violation of I.C.
§ 49-660, as Trooper Rodean did not open the car door to investigate J.C. § 49-660.7As

addressed in Section l(C)(2), Trooper Rodean was not investigating a violation of J.C. §
49-660. Since Trooper Rodean never initiated that investigation, that cannot be used as
a basis to justify Trooper Rodean's actions after the fact.
As initially argued before the Trial Court, the exclusionary rule under Idaho
Constitution is broader than its federal counterpart and should preclude the State from
making after the fact justifications for law enforcement actions. (R Vol. I, pp.55-56.) As
such, Mr. Jay argues that the evidence in this matter should be suppressed under the
Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution for the purposes of deterring

6

The District Court also held that the window tinting on Mr. Jay's vehicle provided a
legal justification to open Mr. Jay's car door. (4/22/19 Tr., p.22, Ls.12-20.) Regarding
this holding, Mr. Jay asserts the same arguments set forth in this Section of his
Appellant's Brief regarding the alleged violation of I.C. § 49-660. Specifically, the Trial
Court did not make any factual findings regarding window tinting, Trooper Rodean was
not investigating Mr. Jay's window tinting, and the potential commission of an infraction
offense does not allow an officer to conduct a search.
7
As argued in his Suppression Memo (R Vol. I, pp.21 -22) Trooper Rodean did not seize
Mr. Jay when he knocked on the closed car window. See State v. Randle, 152 Idaho
860, 861 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding that merely knocking in the window of a parked
vehicle does not constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
Mr. Jay continues to assert the Trooper Rodean should have waited for Mr. Jay to either
initiate contact with Trooper Rodean or allow Mr. Jay to exercise his rights under the
state and federal constitutions by driving away.
15

police conduct. The primary purpose of the federal exclusionary rule is to deter law
enforcement of misconduct and is a mere prophylaxis, not a constitutionally mandated
remedy. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).

Article I Section 17 of the Idaho

Constitution, however, provides a broader exclusionary rule encompassing more than
mere deterrence and it is a constitutionally mandated remedy, as opposed to amere
prophylaxis. State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511,519 (2012).
Here, Trooper Rodean's actions should not be protected because the State
subsequently provided a legal justification for actions which were not legally justified
based on the Trooper Rodean's initial basis to search and/or seize Mr. Jay. A ruling to
the contrary would undermine deterrence, because it encourages law enforcement to
disregard their own understanding of the law and intentionally violate citizens' rights and
hope that an attorney for the State of Idaho will find a legal justification for actions law
enforcement thought were illegal.
Further, even if the aforementioned right for the wrong reason justification is
justifiable under the federal constitution, it should not be allowed in Idaho because of
Idaho's robust exclusionary rule. For over 90 years, Idaho Courts have consistently
suppressed evidence based on warrants that law enforcement had no reason to know
were invalid and the invalidity determination was only made after the warrants were
executed. SeeState v. Arregui,44 Idaho 43(1927); see alsoState v. Oropeza,97 Idaho
387 (1976); Koivu, 152 Idaho at519. If Idaho court's exclude evidence under Article I
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, even in circumstances where deterrence is not at
issue, it makes little sense to forgo exclusion under circumstances like this case, where
law enforcement action is not justified under the original police officer's reasoning and
only justified by an attorney for the State of Idaho after the fact. Here, Trooper Rodean
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just opened Mr. Jay's car door, which constituted a search, and Trooper Rodean
testified that he was not conducting a criminal investigation at that time. (4/18/18 Tr.,
p.13, L.24-p.14, L.12.)
Mr. Jay's position is consistent with recent Idaho case law holding that law
enforcement cannot use the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement when law enforcement determines that they are only going to issue a
citation. State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642,402 P.3d 1095 (2017). In Lee, law enforcement
pulled over a vehicle and the operator of the vehicle had a suspended driver's license,
which is an arrestable offense.

Law enforcement decided to issue a citation for the

charge and subsequently conducted a search, which the State tried to justify as a
search incident to arrest.

The Idaho Supreme Court held that exception was not

applicable because police unequivocally stated they were not going to conduct an
arrest.

Similarly, Trooper Rodean testified he was not conducting a criminal

investigation when opening Mr. Jay's car door and, based on the holding in Lee, the
Trial Court should have restricted is ruling to the original justification for the search.
Moreover, since Mr. Jay was not seized before Trooper Rodean opened the car
door, both the District Court's and Trial Court's reliance on State v. Irwin, 143 Idaho 103
(Ct. App. 2006) (R Vol. I, p.72; 4/22/19 Tr., p.26, L.23 - p.27, L.5), is flawed because
the Irwin Court held that a law enforcement can open a car door during a constitutionally
sound seizure. Here, Trooper Rodean did not seize Mr. Jay and, as such, Trooper
Rodean did not have a constitutional basis to open the car door. This is analogous to
Lee because law enforcement, in that matter, stated they were not going to arrest so

they could not rely on a search incident to arrest as a justification for a search.
Moreover, and as argued in Section l(E), infra, Mr. Jay argues that the holding in Irwin is
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no longer viable in light of United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) and Florida v.
Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013).

Further, the Trial Court noted a legal assertion regarding the relevance of the
question of whether Trooper Rodean was investigating a crime when he opened Mr.
Jay's car door. Specifically, the Trial Court noted:
[T]he officer's subjective intent of whether or not he was conducting a
traffic stop is not relevant to the court's decision in this case, since the
officer had an objectively reasonable basis for conducting a traffic stop
and the officer's subjective motive of actual state of mind is irrelevant.
See State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 61 o (Ct. App. 1990).
(R Vol. I, p.73, n.2.) The Trial Court citied to Myersfor the general proposition that law
enforcement's subjective intent is irrelevant when determining whether a seizure is
based on objective facts that create reasonable suspicion.

In other words, law

enforcement can seize a person for one offense, i.e. speeding, when they really want an
opportunity to investigate another offense, i.e. possession of drugs. Myers holds that
these "pretextual stops" are constitutional if there was reasonable suspicion for the
offense for which the person is seized and law enforcement's subject desire to
investigate another matter is irrelevant.
In this case, Trooper Rodean's subjective intent is relevant because Mr. Jay is
arguing a distinction between the constitutionally significant action law enforcement
conducts versus the reasoning why law enforcement takes that action.

The Myers

Court analyzed law enforcements decision to conduct a seizure and whether that
seizure met the applicable constitutional requirements, the reason why the officer
conducted a seizure is irrelevant. Since Mr. Jay is arguing that Trooper Rodean did not
seize him before opening the car door that is the question before this Court and Trooper
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Rodeants testimony indicating he did not seize Mr. Jay before opening the car door is a
fact relevant to that determination.
In sum, Trooper Rodean testified he was not seizing Mr. Jay to conduct a
criminal investigation. Due to that statement, the District Court erred when it affirmed
the Trial Court's reliance on non-existent criminal investigation to provide a
constitutional basis for Trooper Rodean to open Mr. Jay's car door.

E.

Trooper Rodean Conducted A Warrantless Search Of Mr. Jay's Vehicle
When He Opened Mr. Jay's Car Door
Mr. Jay argues that Trooper Rodean searched his car within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment when Trooper Rodean physically touched his car door to initiate an
investigation. In support of this position, Mr. Jay argues that his vehicle was searched
based on United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)and Florida v. Jardines, 133
S.Ct. 1409 (2013), which clarified that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
wherein the Jones Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects against
governmental intrusions on private property that constitute common-law trespass.
In Jones, law enforcement suspected Antoine Jones was involved in drug
trafficking. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.

The government gathered information about

Mr. Jones' activities and applied for a search warrant authorizing "the use of an
electronic trafficking device" on a vehicle registered to Mr. Jones' wife. Id. The warrant
was issued but required the tracking device be attached in the District of Columbia and
within ten days. Id. Eleven days later, the government attached a Global-PositioningSystem (hereinafter, GPS) tracking device to the undercarriage of Mr. Jones' vehicle
while it was parked in a public parking lot in the State of Maryland. Id. For the next four
weeks a significant amount of data was obtained from the GPS device, and Mr. Jones
was ultimately indicted on federal charges related to drug trafficking. Id.
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Mr. Jones filed

a suppression

motion; the

government conceded

its

noncompliance with the warrant, but argued that a warrant was not required. Id. at 948
n.1.

The district court partially granted the motion precluding the government from

introducing any evidence obtained by the use of the GPS device during periods of time
while Mr. Jones' vehicle was parked in a garage adjoining Mr. Jones' residence. Id. at
948. The district court held, however, that ''the remaining data was admissible, because
'[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another." Id. (quoting United
States v. Jones, 451 F.Supp.2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006)).

The United States Supreme Court eventually granted certiorari.

The central

issue before the Court was "whether the attachment of a [GPS] tracking device to an
individual's vehicle, and the subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle's
movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Id. The Jones opinion began its discussion by further clarifying
that the issue at hand involved the government's physical occupation of "private
property for the purpose of obtaining information." Id. at 949. The Court went on to
hold that this "physical intrusion would have been considered a 'search' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment" when it was originally adopted because at that time,
and for the first half of the 20th century, the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
was tied to common-law trespass. Id. However, the Katz Court "deviated from that
exclusive property-based approach" when it said that ''the Fourth Amendment protects
people not places . ... " Id. at 950 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ).
After setting forth the foregoing framework, the Court then addressed the
Government's argument. Specifically, the government argued that Mr. Jones "had no
20

'reasonable expectation of privacy' in the area of [Mr. Jones' vehicle] accessed by
Government agents (its underbody) and in the locations of the [vehicle] on the public
roads, which were visible to all." Id. The Court then employed the following analysis in
rejecting this argument:
[W]e need not address the Government's contentions, because Jones's
Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katzformulation. At
bottom, we must "assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted." 8 As
explained, for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood
to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas
("persons, houses, papers, and effects") it enumerates.Katz did not
repudiate that understanding. Less than two years later the Court upheld
defendants' contention that the Government could not introduce against
them conversations between other people obtained by warrantless
placement of electronic surveillance devices in their homes. The opinion
rejected the dissent's contention that there was no Fourth Amendment
violation "unless the conversational privacy of the homeowner himself is
9
invaded." "[W]e [do not] believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth
Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was
intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends
to the home...." Id., at 180, 89 S. Ct. 961.
Id. at 950-951 (footnotes omitted) (original emphasis).

The JonesCourt went on to hold that ''the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test." Id. at
952 (emphasis in original). In other words, a reasonable expectation of privacy need
not be established in instances where the State trespasses on a constitutionally
protected area, i.e., a person's house, papers, or effects, as a means to obtain
information.

The Court held that "[b]y attaching the device to the [vehicle], officers

encroached on a protected area." Id.
Further clarification of the trespass theory was provided by the United States
Supreme Court in Jardines, supra. In that case, police officers suspected Jardines was
8

9

Quoting Ky/lo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001 ).
Quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969).
21

growing marijuana. Id. at 1413. Without a search warrant, police officers approached
Jardines' home with a dog trained to detect the scent marijuana and other drugs. Id.
The dog eventually alerted to the presence of illegal drugs while on Jardines' front
porch. Id. Law enforcement then obtaineda search warrant based on the dog's alert,
which revealed marijuana plants. Id. Jardines was arrested and moved to suppress the
marijuana plants on the basis that the dog's sniff on his front porch was an
unreasonable search. Id. The trial court granted the motion and the case found its way
to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 1413"1414.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by holding that the Fourth Amendment
"establishes a simple baseline, one that for much of our history formed the exclusive
basis for its protections: When 'the Government obtains information by physically
intruding' on persons, houses, papers, or effects, 'a 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment' has 'undoubtedly occurred."' Id. at 1414 (quoting Jones, 132 S.Ct.
at 950"951). The first question asked by the Supreme Court is whether the police
physically occupied a constitutionally protected area. Id. at 1414. The Supreme Court
held that the police officers did in fact physically occupy a constitutionally protected area
because Jardines' porch is considered curtilage which is deemed to be part of a
person's house. Id. at 1414"1415. The next question the Supreme Court answered is
whether the physical occupation of Jardines' porch was "accomplished through an
unlicensed physical intrusion." Id. at 1415. The Court initially noted that generally there
is an implicit license for the police to approach a home and knock on the front door. Id.
at 1415"1416. The Court ultimately held, however, that there is no implicit license for
the police to introduce "a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in
hopes of discovering incriminating evidence . . . ."
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Id. at 1416.

As such, the

JardinesCourt determined that the warrantless use of a drug dog to search the curtilage

of Jardines' home violated the Fourth Amendment.
Properly distilled, the property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment
requires a simple analysis. The first question is whether the area physically occupied
by the government is a constitutionally protected area, i.e. a person's house, papers, or
effects. The second question is whether the physical occupation of the constitutionally
protected area was "accomplished through an unlicensed physical intrusion." Id. at
1415.

According to the Jardines Court, "One virtue of the Fourth Amendment's

property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy." Id. at 1417.
As another point of clarification, this property-based approach focuses on the
area that the government is occupying and not on the area observed. In other words,
the focus of the inquiry is not where a police officer is looking; the focus of the inquiry is
where the police officer is standing or what the officer is touching at the time the officer
makes an observation.
An analysis of the facts from Jones, supra, in comparison of the facts from the
instant case illustrates this concept. In Jones it was not argued that Mr. Jones had a
privacy interest in the underbody of his vehicle, "which was visible to all." Id. at 950.
Similarly. Mr. Jay is not asserting that he has a privacy interest in the exterior door
handle of his vehicle. That similarity is important because the Supreme Court implicitly
noted in Jones that the government had other legal means to obtain the evidence it
ultimately suppressed, and that the Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the
government made the decision to encroach on the underbody of Mr. Jones' vehicle,
which is a constitutionally protected area. Id. at 951-953. This case is very similar in
that Trooper Rodean had the option of waiting for Mr. Jay to either drive away, see
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Randle, supranote 7, or wait to see if Mr. Jay would voluntarily initiate contact with

Trooper Rodean. The "search" that implicates the Fourth Amendment is the physical
intrusion committed by Trooper Rodean.
There is also persuasive authority in support of Mr. Jay's general position that
opening a car door is a search. In McHam v. State, 404 S.C. 465, 470, 746 S.E.2d 41,
44 (2013), law enforcement lawfully stopped a vehicle.

While the occupants were

gathering registration and insurance information, a police officer walked around the
vehicle and opened a passenger door because the officer could not see the occupants'
hands. Id. After opening the door, the officer immediately observed contraband. Id.
The South Carolina Supreme Court ultimately held that opening the car door constituted
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This holding is consistent with
the foregoing authority and Arizona v. Hicks,480 U.S. 321, 325(1987), where it was held
that even small intrusions can be an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, "minimal" intrusions such as placing a foot in a door preventing a suspect
from closing a door are a search.

SeeState v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 822 (2004)

(holding that officer's use of foot to prevent defendant from closing the door constituted
an unlawful entry, regardless of the extent of the intrusion); see also State v. Hudson,
147 Idaho 335, 337 (Ct. App. 2009) (applying the holding from Maland to law
enforcement's foot preventing a defendant from closing a motel door). As such,
Trooper Rodean conducted a warrantless search of Mr. Jay's vehicle when he opened
the door.
Both the District Court's and Trial Court's primary ruling that probable cause for a
violation of I.C. § 49-660 provided a legal basis to open Mr. Jay's car door, does not

24

address Mr. Jay's primary contention that opening a car door constitutes a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court's holding follows:
The Court also finds that State v. Irwin is controlling in this case, and
opening a vehicle door does not rise to the level of a search in each and
every case, 143 Idaho 103, Court of Appeals 2006. I find that case to be
more closer in the factual application than the cases cited by the
defendant regarding curtilage and GPS instruments.
(4/22/19 Tr., p. 26, L.23 - p.27, L.5.)
The Trial Court's ruling follows:
Trooper Rodean was investigating a traffic violation, for which he had
probable cause. An officer is not per se prohibited from opening a
vehicle's door, especially when the officer has probable cause of criminal
activity. Nonetheless, in this case, the opening of the door was not
unreasonable and was a minimal intrusion by Trooper Rodean given the
totality of the circumstances. See State v. Irwin, 143 Idaho 102 (Ct. App.
2006).
(R Vol. I, p.72.)
Neither the District Court's holding nor the Trial Court's ruling addressed
Mr. Jay's primary argument that opening a car door constitutes a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

That omission is problematic as Jones and

Jardines post-date Irwin. This is also problematic because the authority citied by the

Idaho Court of Appeals in Irwin refer to the Katz reasonableness-expectation-of-privacytest which the Jones Court expressly held is a distinct and separate inquiry from the
common-law trespassory test. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 ("[T]he Katz reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test."). For example, the Irwin Court citied to State v. James, 13 P.3d 576
(2000) when holding opening a car door is not a search; however, the James Court's
analysis, which also predates Jones and Jardines, is based on the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test as applied to automobiles. James, 13 P .3d at 579-580.

25

Additional support for Mr. Jay's position can be found in Taylor v. City of
Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2019), wherein the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held

that the act of using chalk to mark tires as a means to track howlong a vehicle has been
parked for the purposes of writing a parking citation constituted a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. When coming to this holding the Taylor Court
reasoned:
[T]here has been a trespass in this case because the City made
intentional physical contact with Taylor's vehicle. As the district court
properly found, this physical intrusion, regardless of how slight, constitutes
common-law trespass. This is so, even though "no damage [is done] at
all." Jones, 565 U.S. at 405, 132 S.Ct. 945 (quoting Entick v. Carrington,
95 Eng. Rep. 807,817 (C.P. 1765)).
Id. at 332-33. In this case, opening Mr. Jay's car door constituted a search because it

was a physical trespass on a constitutionally protected area. The Taylor holding is in
direct contravention of the District Court's holding and the Trial Court's ruling, in this
matter, that minimal intrusions are allowed under state and federal constitutions. (A
Vol. I, p.72; 4/22/19 Tr., p.20, L.12 - p.21, L.5.)
In the event, opening vehicle door constitutes a search, probable cause for a
violation I.C. § 49-660

10

does not provide a basis for a search of the vehicle. See

Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 {1998) (holding that issuing a traffic citation does not

provide law enforcement with a constitutional basis to search the cited person's
vehicle). Even if this Court rejects Mr. Jay's argument in Section 1(0), supra, and holds
that Trooper Rodean had reasonable suspicion to contact Mr. Jay for a violation of I.C.
§ 49-660, a traffic infraction does not provide a constitutional basis to search a vehicle.

If opening a car door constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,

10

As noted above, Mr. Jay also asserts that the purported "dark" window tinting would
not provide a basis to search Mr. Jay's vehicle. (4/22/19 Tr., p.22, Ls.12-20.)
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then either reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a violation of I.C. § 49-660 does
not provide a basis for the search.

F.

Trooper Rodean's Actions Were Not Justified Under The Community
Caretaker Exception To The Warrant Requirement
As a preliminary matter, the District Court erred when affirming the Trial Court

ruling in this matter based on the community caretaker exception to the warrant
requirement because the Trial Court did not make any rulings or specific factual findings
in application of the community caretaker exception. (R Vol. I, p.73, n.3.) In the event
this Court determines that this warrant exception is applicable, Mr. Jay asserts that this
matter should be remanded so the Trial Court can make the requisite factual findings
and legal rulings.
Insofar as this Court applies the community caretaker exception to the warrant
requirement without a remand, Mr. Jay asserts that it is not applicable because the Trial
Court made the factual finding that Trooper Rodean was not responding to an
emergency. (R Vol. I, p.71.) A detention is constitutionally permissible if it is reasonably
conducted in furtherance of the government agent's community caretaking function. See
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433(1973). The community caretaking function arises

from the duty of police officers to help citizens in need of assistance, State v.
Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754(1997), and it is

11

totally divorced from the detection,

investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."
Cady, 413 U.S. at 441.

In analyzing community caretaking function cases, Idaho has adopted a totality of
the circumstances test. Wixom, at 754.

The constitutional standard is whether the

intrusive action of the police was reasonable in view of all the surrounding
circumstances. Id. Reasonableness is determined by balancing the public need and
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interest furthered by the police conduct against the degree and nature of the intrusion
upon the privacy of the citizen. State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 495(1992). In order for
the community caretaking function analysis to apply, an officer must possess a
subjective belief that an individual is in need of immediate assistance.State v.
Deccio, 136 Idaho 442, 445(Ct.App.2001 ).

As mentioned above, the community caretaker exception is not applicable
because the Trial Court found that Trooper Rodean was not responding to an
emergency. The Trial Court specific ruled, "[t]ere was no emergency situation, and the
Defendant, in the driver's seat, had merely pulled off to sleep, even though he was only
a few miles to the nearest exit." (R Vol. I, p.71.) Moreover, there were no distress calls
to dispatch, emergency lights, or other factors evincing an emergency. (See generally,
4/18/18 Tr., p.12, L1 - p.41, L.15.) Once Trooper Rodean noticed that Mr. Jay was
possibly moving (4/18/18 Tr., p.39, Ls.11-16), 11 he should have provided Mr. Jay an
opportunity to drive away, as was the Court of Appeals' holding in Randle, supra note 7,
or voluntary initiate contact with Trooper Rodean.
Mr. Jay recognizes that the District Court held that the Trial Court made sufficient
factual findings for the District Court to apply the community caretaking exception, he
nonetheless asserts that the Trial Court's ruling must encompass the application of an
exception to the warrant requirement in order for an appellate court to properly consider
that exception on appeal. (4/22/19 Tr., p.21, L.6 - p.25, L.13.)

G.

Trooper Rodean's Actions Were Not Justified Under The Inevitable
Discovery Exception To The Warrant Requirement

11

The video recording form Trooper Rodean's dash camera reflects that there was
movement in Mr. Jay's car before Trooper Rodean opened the car door. See
Defendant's Exhibit A, 9:20:33 - 9:20:41.
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As a preliminary matter, the Trial Court did not make any rulings or specific
factual findings in application of the inevitable discovery exception. (R Vol. I, p.73, n.3.)
In the event this Court determines that this warrant exception is applicable Mr. Jay
asserts that this matter should be remanded so the Trial Court can make the requisite
factual findings and legal rulings.
Insofar as this Court will apply the inevitable discovery exception to the warrant
requirement without a remand, Mr. Jay asserts that it is not applicable to the facts in this
case. Support for Mr. Jay's position can be found in State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908,
912, 136 P.3d 379, 383 (Ct. App. 2006) (criticized on other grounds in State v.
Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 155 P.3d 704 {Ct. App. 2006), wherein the police lawfully

entered Bunting's garage and possibly obtained enough evidence to support a warrant.
Instead of obtaining a warrant, police subsequently conducted a warrantless entry of the
same garage in contravention of Bunting's constitutional rights and discovered
incriminating evidence.

Id. Idaho Court of Appeals held that it would not condone a

warrantless entry under the inevitable discovery doctrine when police had probable
cause for a warrant but failed to secure a warrant. The Bunting Court's holding follows:
Given the facts in this case, it is possible that, had the police made the
effort to put all the evidence gleaned from the lawful entry into Bunting's
garage before the magistrate, there could have been sufficient probable
cause to issue a valid warrant. However, that was not what happened and
the police did not obtain a valid warrant. Therefore, we decline to extend
the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule to include the
situation where the police may have had sufficient evidence to obtain a
warrant but failed to present it and obtain a valid search warrant.
Id. at 917, 136 P.3d at 388. See also State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 392 (Ct. App.

1985) (hold that the inevitable discovery doctrine "is not intended to swallow the
exclusionary rule whole by substituting what the police should have done for what they
really did.") (quoting State v. Cook,106 Idaho 209, 226(Ct.App.1984)). As such, the
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mere fact Trooper Rodean arguably had reasonable suspicion to justify contact with Mr.
Jay, Trooper Rodean did not seize Mr. Jay, precluding the applicability of the inevitable
discovery exception to the warrant requirement. Again, since knocking on Mr. Jay's
window did not constitute a seizure12 and because Trooper Rodean was not seizing Mr.
Jay,

13

Trooper Rodean should have waited for Mr. Jay to voluntarily initiate contact or

drive away. See Randle, supra note 7.

H.

The Exclusionary Rule is Applicable In This Matter
All of the evidence obtained by TrooperRodeanshould be suppressed because

Mr. Jay's car was searched without a warrant when Trooper Rodean opened Mr. Jay's
car door. It follows thatthe all evidence obtained after the illegal search and seizure
should also be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun, 317 U.S. 471
(1963).
In sum, Mr. Jay argues that Law enforcement conducted a warrantless search of
his vehicle when opening his car door that violated state and federal rights. Mr. Jay
argues that all of the evidence the State obtained in violation of those rights should be
suppressed.
II.
This Court Should Reverse The District Court's Oral Order Affirming The Trial Court's
Memo Denying Motion To Suppress, Based On The Idaho Supreme Court's Holding In
State v. Clarke
A.

Introduction
Approximately two months after the District Court orally affirmed the Trial Court's

ruling in this matter, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Clarke, 446
P.3d 451 (2019), wherein it held that law enforcement cannot arrest suspects for
12

13

See State v. Randle, 152 Idaho 860, 861 (Ct. App. 2012).
(4/18/18 Tr. p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.12.)
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completed misdemeanor offenses when law enforcement did not observe the conduct
providing the basis for thearrest. In this case, Trooper Rodean did not observe Mr. Jay
driving, but Mr. Jay was arrested for driving without privileges. It was during a search
incident to that arrest and a subsequent inventory search when law enforcement
discovered Mr. Jay's true identity and drug paraphernalia. Mr. Jay also argues that the
Clarke holding is applicable to his case based on Griffith v. United States, 479 U.S. 314

(1987).

8.

Standards of Review And Other Applicable Standards
The applicable standards regarding appellate review and fundamental state and

federal constitutional provisions were previously articulated in Section I, supra, and are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

C.

The Retroactivity Doctrine Requires That This Court Apply Clarke To Trooper
Rodean's Searches Of Mr. Jay's Person And Mr. Jay's Vehicle
As mentioned above, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an opinion in State v.

Clarke, 165 Idaho 393 (2019), while the instant appeal was pending from the District

Court's appellate holding. The primary holding in Clarke is that law enforcement must
observe the conduct providing the basis for a misdemeanor offense in order to conduct
a warrantless arrest. Mr. Jay asserts that the holding in Clarke is applicable to the facts
of his case based on Griffith v. United States, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), and United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982).

In Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether Payton v. New York, 14
which prohibited police from making a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a
suspect's home to make a felony arrest, should be applied retroactively to cases not yet

14

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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final when the decision was rendered. Id. 457 U.S. at 537-539. The Johnson Court
adopted the following analysis. The Court first determines whether it "has expressly
declared a rule of criminal procedure to be a 'clear break with the past," such that the
Court has announced an "entirely new and unanticipated principle of law." Id. at 549551 (citing Desist v. United Statest 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969)). A clear break within the
law occurs "only when a decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court ...
or disapproves a practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases . . . or
overturns a longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken,
but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority expressly approved." Id. at
551 (internal citations omitted). Where the Court finds an unanticipated "new rule" has
been createdt to determine its retroactivity, the Court is to look to "(a) the purpose to be
served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new standards." Id. at 544 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967)). However, where a decision construing the Fourth Amendment is not
a "clear break from the past" it is applied retroactively to all cases not yet final when the
decision is handed down. Id. at 562; see also Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638t 641, fn.3
(1984).
The Johnson Court explained its rationale for applying Payton retroactively to all
cases not yet final. First, '"[r]efusal to apply new constitutional rules to all cases arising
on direct review .. . tends to cut this Court loose from the force of precedent, allowing
us to restructure artificially those expectations legitimately created by extant law and
thereby mitigate the practical force of stare decisis . . . a force which ought properly to
bear on the judicial resolution of any legal problem."' Id. at 554-556 (quoting Mackey v.
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United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680-681 (1971)).

Next, the retroactive application of

Payton to cases on direct review would "do justice to each litigant on the merits of his

own case" and "resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best
understanding of governing constitutional principles." Id. at 555 (citing Desist at 259;
Mackey at 679). The Court observed that "[i]f a 'new' constitutional doctrine is truly

right, we should not reverse lower courts which have accepted it; nor should we affirm
those which have rejected the very arguments we have embraced." Id. (citing Desist at
259).

Finally, retroactive application furthers the goal of treating similarly situated

defendants similarly. Id. The Court continued, "it goes without saying that Theodore
Payton also was arrested before Payton was decided, and he received the benefit of the
rule in his case." Id. "An approach that resolvedal/ nonfinal convictions under the same
rule of law would lessen the possibility that this Court might mete out different
constitutional protection to defendants simultaneously subjected to identical police
conduct." Id.
The Johnson majority also addressed the concerns against the adoption of this
retroactivity doctrine. The government in Johnson argued that if the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, the evidence should only be suppressed
if the "law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may be properly charged with
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."
(citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)).

Id.

In other words, the

government argued that "new Fourth Amendment rules must be denied retroactive
effect in all cases except those in which law enforcement officers failed to act in goodfaith compliance with then-prevailing constitutional norms," and under an objective test,
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law enforcement officers can only be charged with knowledge of all "settled" Fourth
Amendment law. Id. The Court quickly dispelled this argument, stating:
Under this view, the only Fourth Amendment rulings worthy of retroactive
application are those in which the arresting officers violated pre-existing
guidelines clearly established by prior cases. But as we have seen above,
cases involving simple application of clear, pre-existing Fourth
Amendment guidelines raise no real questions of retroactivity at all.
Literally read, the Government's theory would automatically eliminate a//
Fourth Amendment rulings from consideration for retroactive application.
Id. at 560. Next, the government claimed that retroactive effect of Payton would not

serve the policies under the exclusionary rule and would have little deterrent effect
"because law enforcement officers would rarely be deterred from engaging in a practice
they never expected to be invalidated." Id. The Court observed that it cannot rule on
every unsettled question under the Fourth Amendment and years may pass before it

finally "invalidates a police practice of dubious constitutionality." Id. Moreover, if "all
rulings resolving unsettled Fourth Amendment questions should be nonretroactive, then,
in close cases, law enforcement officials would have little incentive to err on the side of
constitutional behavior." Id. at 561 (emphasis added). This would "encourage police or

other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to adopt a let's-wait-untilit's-decided approach." Id (citing Desist at 277). Based on the foregoing rationales, the
Johnson Court found that Payton applied retroactive to all cases not yet final.

Then, in 1987, three years after the United States Supreme Court announced the
good faith doctrine in United States v.Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court again
revisited the retroactivity doctrine in Griffith v. United States, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). In
Griffith, the Court was concerned with the potential retroactivity of Batson v. Kentucky,
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476 U.S. 79 (1986).15 In Griffith, the Court recognized the previous three prong test for
retroactivity as well as the new test articulated in Johnson for dealing with Fourth
Amendment cases. Id. 479 U.S. at 321-322. Relying heavily on the Johnson Court's
analysis, which had embraced Justice Harlan's rationale in Desist16and Mackey, 17 the
Court held, "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied
retroactively to all cases ... not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new
rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past."

Id. at 328.

In doing so, the Court

observed, "[t]he fact that a new rule may constitute a clear break with the past has no
bearing on the 'actual inequity that results' when only one of many similarly situated
defendants receives the benefit of the new rule."

Id. at 327-328.

The Court

acknowledged that it would be impossible to hear every case pending on direct review
and apply the rule to each case, but would "fulfill our judicial responsibility by instructing
the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively to cases not yet final." Id. at 323.
It is readily apparent that the post-Leon decision in Griffith, which adopted the
analysis of Johnson that implicitly included the Court's discussion of the exclusionary
rule and deterrence, effectively removed the application of the good faith doctrine to
cases pending on direct review when a decision interpreting the Constitution is rendered
by this land's highest court. Just as law enforcement in Clarkewere operating under an
unconstitutional statute that was directly contravened by prior Idaho Supreme Court
case law, so was Trooper Rodean in the instant case. The "integrity of judicial review"
requires that all similarly situated defendants be treated the same.
15

Here, where Mr.

In Batson, the Court held that a criminal defendant could establish a prima facie case
of racial discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment based on a prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges to strike members of a defendant's race from a jury
venire. Id. at 96-98.
16
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
17
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 ( 1971 ).
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Jay's rights were violated by unconstitutional conduct by law enforcement he is entitled
to the same remedy as Clarke, suppression of the fruits of the unlawful acts.
Accordingly, as articulated herein, this Court should apply the retroactivity
doctrine and reverse the District Court's oral order affirming the denying Mr. Jay's
suppression motion.

D.

An Application OfClarke To The Facts Of Mr. Jay's Case Should Result In
Suppression Of All Evidence Trooper Rodean Obtained During The Search Of
Mr. Jay's Person And Mr. Jay's Vehicle
If this Court holds that State v. Clarke, 446 P.3d 451 (2019) should be

retroactively applied to the facts of Mr. Jay's case, an application of Clarke requires
suppression of evidence law enforcement discovered after Mr. Jay's person was
searched subsequent to his arrest for driving without privileges. Since Trooper Rodean
discovered Mr. Jay's true identity during the warrantless search incident to Mr. Jay's
arrest, the evidence providing the basis for Mr. Jay's false information to police charge
should be suppressed.

Additionally, the evidence that was discovered during the

inventory search of Mr. Jay's vehicle that provided the basis for the drug paraphernalia
charge should also be suppressed because there would have been no basis to impound
Mr. Jay's vehicle if Mr. Jay was not arrested for driving without privileges.
In Clarke, Clarke made unwanted sexual advancements towards a woman who
was with her son at a beach in northern Idaho. Clarke, 446 P.3d at 452-53. At one
point, Mr. Clarke sat down next to the woman and "grabbed her 'butt.'" Id. Clarke was
eventually arrested for misdemeanor battery and a warrantless search of Mr. Clarke's
person incident to that arrest yielded methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Id. at
453. Clarke filed a suppression motion and argued that his warrantless arrest violated
his state and federal constitutional rights, as the arresting police officer did not
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personally observe the conduct providing probable cause for the misdemeanor arrest.
Id. The district court denied Clarke's suppression motion and Clarke appealed. Id.

The Idaho Supreme Court retained Clarke's appeal and held that ''that the
framers of the Idaho Constitution understood Article I, section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution prohibited warrantless arrests for completed misdemeanors." Id. at 457.
In coming to the holding, the Idaho Supreme Court conducted an exhaustive analysis of
common law that predated the Idaho Constitution and Idaho appellate court decisions
that posted-dated the Idaho Constitution and pre-dated the Idaho Legislature's 1979
adoption of I.C. § 19-603(6). From that analysis, it is apparent that law enforcement
was always required to personally observe the commission of a misdemeanor offense in
order to subject a suspect to a warrantless arrest. Since this personal observation
requirement for misdemeanor arrests is provided in Article I, section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution, the Idaho Supreme Court exercised it power of judicial review holding that
I.C. § 19-603(6) is unconstitutional.
An application of the holding of Clarke to the facts of Mr. Jay's case provides
multiple bases for suppression of evidence that are independent than the bases for
suppression Mr. Jay originally argued before both the Trial Court and the District Court.
The District Court aptly summarized the following facts that happen to be directly
relevant to a suppression inquiry pursuant to Clarke:
[Mr. Jay] admitted he was driving without a license and that would
be a basis for a misdemeanor arrest. He was searched. His correct ID
was found. And then it was discovered he had an outstanding felony
warrant, and the vehicle was properly searched subject to the inventory
search prior to towing since there was no other driver to drive the vehicle.
(4/22/19 Tr., p. 27, Ls.11-19.) It was during this inventory search when law enforcement
''found drug paraphernalia." (R Vol. I, p.70.)
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Assuming Trooper Rodean had probable cause that Mr. Jay was driving without
a driver's license, Trooper Rodean did not have a legal basis to arrest Mr. Jay for that
offense pursuant to Clarke because Trooper Rodean did not observe Mr. Jay driving
and driving without privileges is a misdemeanor offense.

The Trial Court's factual

findings that Mr. Jay's vehicle "parked" and that Mr. Jay's "car was off," as Trooper
Rodean initially approached Mr. Jay clearly indicates that Trooper Rodean did not
observe Mr. Jay driving his vehicle. Further, Mr. Jay was citied, arrested, and pleaded
guilty to driving without privileges, J.C. § 18-8001, which is a misdemeanor offense. (R
Vol. I, p.8; 4/22/19 Tr., p.27, Ls.11-19; A Vol. I, pp.79-83.)
The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is not
applicable to the warrantless search Mr. Jay's person after he was arrested for the
misdemeanor offense of driving without privileges.

While Trooper Rodean had the

ability to cite Mr. Jay for driving without privileges, Trooper Rodean could not search Mr.
Jay as the Idaho Supreme Court has held that law enforcement cannot use the search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement when law enforcement only
issues a citation. State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642 (2017).
Mr. Jay's true identity is excludable as the fruit if the poisonous tree as that
evidence was obtained during the illegal search of Mr. Jay's person during the
aforementioned search incident to arrest for driving without privileges. According to the
Trial Court's factual findings it was during the search incident to the arrest for driving
without privileges that Mr. Jay's "wallet was found in his pants pocket, which contained
[Mr. Jay's] Idaho identification card." (R Vol. I, p.70.) It was with Mr. Jay's identification
card that Trooper Rodean discovered Mr. Jay's ''true name and true date of birth." (R
Vol. I, p.70.) Without this information, the State would not have had a basis to charge
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Mr. Jay with the misdemeanor offense of false information to law enforcement.
Additionally, Mr. Jay would not have pleaded guilty to that offense had the State been
unable to prove his true name.
Absent Mr. Jay's arrest for driving without privileges, Trooper Rodeandidn't have
a constitutional basis to search Mr. Jay's vehicle and it was during that search that law
enforcement discovered drug paraphernalia. (R Vol. I., p.70.)
An inventory search is not valid unless the police first obtain lawful possession of
the vehicle. State v.Stewart, 152 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2012). The Idaho Supreme
Court held:
An impoundment of a vehicle constitutes a seizure and is thus subject to
the limitations of the Fourth Amendment. If the impoundment violates the
Fourth Amendment, the accompanying inventory is also tainted, and
evidence found in the search must be suppressed.
State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288 (1995). An impoundment will be found to comply with

Fourth Amendment standards only if it was reasonable under all the circumstances
known to the police when the decision to impound was made. Stewart, 152 Idaho at
870. The initial decision to impound a vehicle following the operator's arrest is left to the
discretion of the officer involved. State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 80 (1991) In Colorado
v.Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that police

may exercise discretion in determining whether to impound a vehicle, provided that
discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something
other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.

In this case, law enforcement

would not have had a constitutional basis to impound Mr. Jay's vehicle had Mr. Jay not
been arrested for driving without privileges. While law enforcement could have arrested
Mr. Jay had he attempted to drive away after Mr. Jay indicated he did not have a
driver's license, law enforcement had no basis to impound Mr. Jay's vehicle absent
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observing him drive.

Trooper Rodean should have citied Mr. Jay and left Mr. Jay

withthe reasonability of legally removing his vehicle for the roadway.
In sum, Mr. Jay argues that the holding from Clarke is applicable to this case
pursuant to Griffithand since Trooper Rodean didn't observe Mr. Jay driving Mr. Jay's
arrest for the misdemeanor offense of driving without privileges was unlawful. It follows,
that all of the evidence found in reliance on the warrantless search incident to that arrest
should be excluded, including the evidence regarding Mr. Jay's true identify and the
drug paraphernalia discovered in his vehicle.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Jay respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's order
denying his motion to suppress and remand this case to the District Court for further
proceedings.
DATED: 10/24/2019.
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